Farman Rashad
The formation of a new government in Baghdad is usually a moment of high drama for Iraq’s Kurds, but as the dust settles on the latest federal power-sharing deal, a more localized, and perhaps more dangerous, storm is gathering in Erbil.
For months, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) were locked in a bitter struggle over posts in the new Iraqi administration, most notably the Presidency. But with those roles now filled, the focus of their rivalry has returned to the center of the Kurdistan Region’s political life: the formation of the next Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).
The KDP is currently weighing two primary scenarios to bypass the PUK’s veto power. And the PUK is working on a two-pronged strategy to handicap KDP Masrour Barzani’s caretaker administration.
What emerges is a picture of a political process that has not only stalled but is being actively dismantled by the very parties that claim to lead it.
Parliamentary stagnation
The Kurdistan parliamentary elections of October 20, 2024, were meant to provide a fresh mandate. Instead, they have yielded a vacuum. Due to a total collapse in cooperation over key leadership posts, the new parliament has managed only a single session – a swearing-in ceremony on October 2.
Under the parliament’s own bylaws, the first session is legally mandated to elect the speakership. Instead, the session was left “open,” a political maneuver that has now persisted for nearly 19 months.
The Amargi has set out to investigate the new developments following the formation of the Iraqi government, revealing that both parties are now operating on divergent, and increasingly scorched-earth, trajectories.
The KDP’s legal gambit
According to information obtained by The Amargi and confirmed by two separate sources, the KDP is currently weighing two primary scenarios to bypass the PUK’s veto power.
The first involves a creative reinterpretation of the “50+1” quorum rule. The KDP’s logic rests on the fact that while the parliament has 100 seats, only 97 members have taken the legal oath. Two members of the Kurdistan Justice Group (Komal) are boycotting on party orders, and Lahur Sheikh Jangi of the People’s Front has refused to enter, seeking to pass his seat to a successor.
The KDP aims to leverage the Shura Council – a body under the KRG Ministry of Justice tasked with interpreting legal disputes – to rule that a session can be held with a reduced quorum of 47 members. To ensure a favorable outcome, the KDP has already moved to consolidate its grip on the Council. Following the retirement of five PUK-affiliated members last month, Prime Minister Masrour Barzani issued an order appointing five KDP members in their place.
The second scenario is an electoral reset. With the mandate of Iraq’s Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) set to expire in January 2027, the KDP is exploring a plan where the KRI Presidency would appoint 10 judges to oversee early elections, effectively abandoning the current results.
However, the legal ground for these moves is shaky. A legal source familiar with the matter told The Amargi that the success of these scenarios is “extremely weak”, noting that the PUK could easily dismantle them through appeals to the Federal Supreme Court in Baghdad.
The PUK’s financial siege
The PUK, for its part, is not waiting for a legal interpretation. According to The Amargi’s investigation, the party is working on a two-pronged strategy to handicap Masrour Barzani’s caretaker administration.
The first path involves the Prime Minister-designate, Ali Zaidi. The PUK is attempting to convince Zaidi’s government to strictly enforce the Federal Court’s definition of a “caretaker government” against Erbil. This would limit the KRG’s financial access to “operational expenditures” only – strictly salaries and basic daily costs. By doing so, Baghdad would reject any other spending requests submitted through the monthly Trial Balance reports sent to the Iraqi Ministry of Finance.
If Ali Zaidi hesitates to take action, the PUK plans to return to the Federal Supreme Court. The party intend to use previous court rulings to force the federal government to legally restrict the powers of the KRG Prime Minister.
The PUK’s ultimate goal is to strip Masrour Barzani of his full executive authority, to force him to concede to a new power-sharing agreement.
If the KDP and PUK cannot find a way to govern together, they may soon find that they have very little left to govern at all.
The cost of fragmentation
While Erbil and Sulaimani trade legal and financial blows, the casualty is the constitutional status of the Kurdistan Region itself. The deep-seated animosity between the KDP and PUK is pushing the Region’s status toward a dangerous unknown.
The warning signs are already visible in Baghdad. In the official program of Iraq’s Prime Minister-designate, Ali Zaidi, there is a conspicuous absence: no mention of the federal system or any framework for regulating the relationship between the federal government and the KRG.
This omission is more than a clerical oversight; it is a clear indicator of how much the Kurdistan Region’s political and legal leverage has eroded. If the KDP and PUK cannot find a way to govern together, they may soon find that they have very little left to govern at all.
